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Abstract In this article, we establish a new phenomenon of
“inattentional deafness” and highlight the level of load on
visual attention as a critical determinant of this phenome-
non. In three experiments, we modified an inattentional
blindness paradigm to assess inattentional deafness. Partic-
ipants made either a low- or high-load visual discrimination
concerning a cross shape (respectively, a discrimination of
line color or of line length with a subtle length difference).
A brief pure tone was presented simultaneously with the
visual task display on a final trial. Failures to notice the
presence of this tone (i.e., inattentional deafness) reached a
rate of 79% in the high-visual-load condition, significantly
more than in the low-load condition. These findings
establish the phenomenon of inattentional deafness under
visual load, thereby extending the load theory of attention
(e.g., Lavie, Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human
Perception and Performance, 25, 596–616, 1995)t o
address the cross-modal effects of visual perceptual load.
Keywords Attention.Load.Inattentional blindness.
Cross-modal.Awareness
A wealth of research has suggested that the extent to which
focused attention on a task results in reduced perception of
irrelevant information depends on the level of perceptual
load in the task (see Lavie, 2005, 2010, for reviews). The
concept of perceptual load corresponds to the amount of
information involved in the perceptual processing of the
task stimuli. This is operationally defined in terms of either
the number of different task stimuli or the perceptual
requirements of the task performed on the same stimuli
(e.g., a simple feature detection task involves less
perceptual load than a complex perceptual discrimination
task). Many studies have found that low-load tasks leave
spare capacity that spills over to the processing of task-
irrelevant information. In contrast, tasks involving higher
perceptual load consume all or most of attentional
capacity, leaving little or none remaining for processing
any task-irrelevant information (Lavie, 1995;L a v i e&
Tsal, 1994). Indeed, reduced perceptual processing of task-
irrelevant information in high-load tasks leads to various
forms of “inattentional blindness” (Mack & Rock, 1998).
These range from failures to recognize meaningful
distractor objects (Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2005;L a v i e ,
Lin, Zokaei, & Thoma, 2009)t of a i l u r e st on o t i c et h em e r e
presence of stimuli (Carmel, Saker, Rees, & Lavie, 2007;
Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Macdonald & Lavie,
2008; Neisser & Becklen, 1975;S i m o n s&C h a b r i s ,1999).
To date, the majority of evidence for the effects of
perceptual load on awareness, and conversely on inatten-
tional blindness, has been obtained within the visual
modality. The world, however, is multisensory: We are
constantly bombarded by information from all sensory
modalities simultaneously. In everyday life, we find
ourselves focusing attention on a task in one modality—
for example, reading—while also being exposed to infor-
mation from other modalities—such as people talking
nearby. The question of whether perception of the irrelevant
auditory information depends on the level of perceptual
load in the visual task is important for understanding the
effects of attention on perception, in a way that is more
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sory world. Furthermore, whether or not an auditory
stimulus reaches awareness while attention is engaged in a
visual task of high perceptual load is of particular importance,
since there are many situations in everyday life in which such
“inattentional deafness” would be highly undesirable. For
example, would the sound of your phone ringing, or of your
car alarm somewhere down the street, be noticed when you
were engaged in a computer task involving high visual
processing load? Would a car horn be noticed when you were
attending to a visually loaded billboard?
Hence, we ask whether perceptual load in a visual
attention task will modulate conscious awareness of task-
unrelated auditory tones. For this purpose, we modified an
inattentional blindness paradigm (e.g., Cartwright-Finch &
Lavie, 2007) to investigate the effects of visual task
demands on the incidence of inattentional deafness. Akin
to the study of Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, participants
performed a visual discrimination task of either low or high
perceptual load for a few trials. In a change from
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie’s design, however, in the last
experimental trial a tone was presented, and participants
were asked whether they had noticed the tone.
Opposing predictions of the results can be derived from
previous suggestions that perceptual capacity is either
modality specific (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972;
Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; McLeod, 1977; Treisman
& Davies, 1973) or shared between modalities (Broadbent,
1958; see, e.g., Santangelo, Belardinelli, & Spence, 2007;
Sinnett, Costa, & Soto-Faraco, 2006, for more recent
claims). If sensory modalities have separate attentional
capacities, then the level of visual perceptual load will not
affect auditory attention and, hence, the incidence of
inattentional deafness; on the other hand, if attentional
capacity is shared by all modalities, then high visual
perceptual load will diminish this resource, leading to
reduced processing of auditory stimuli and resulting in a
higher incidence of inattentional deafness, as compared to a
task with low visual perceptual load.
General method
Participants performed the same visual discrimination task
used by Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007). A central cross
shape was briefly presented (150 ms) in each trial. One of
the cross armswas green, and the other was blue, and one was
slightly longer than the other. In the low-load condition,
participantswereaskedtoindicatewhicharmwasblue,andin
the high-load condition, they were asked to indicate which of
thearmswaslonger.Thesubtlelinelengthdiscriminationtask
in the high-load condition should demand considerably more
attentional resources than the low-load color detection task
(Bonnel, Possamaï, & Schmitt, 1987; Lavie, 1995), and such
a manipulation of load has been shown to reduce both the
influence of distractors on task reaction times (RTs) and rates
of reports of awareness in previous visual perceptual load
studies (for reviews, see Lavie, 2005, 2010). In the seventh
trial, a critical stimulus (CS) was presented—here, a task-
unrelated pure tone. Awareness of the tone was assessed
immediately following the task response. A control trial
followed this critical trial, in which the same tone was
presented, but this time the participants were instructed to
ignore the cross stimulus and to just listen for the tone. Any
participant who failed to notice the tone in this control trial
was excluded from the analysis.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants Fifty six participants were recruited at Uni-
versity College London (UCL). Of these, 7 were excluded
and replaced, either because they did not report awareness
of the CS in the control trial, or because they responded
incorrectly to the cross task in the critical trial, or because
their mean error rate on the cross task was greater than
40%. The mean age of those included was 22.0 years (SD =
4.8 years), and there were 31 males. All of the participants in
this experiment, and in the rest of the experiments reported,
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal hearing,
and were naïve to the purposes of the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli The experiments were created and
run with E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Sharpsburg, PA) on a Dell PC attached to a 15-in. monitor.
Auditory stimuli were played to the participants through a
pair of Philips SBC HP160 stereo headphones. A viewing
distance of 57 cm was maintained throughout the experi-
ment. In each trial, a cross stimulus was presented (see
Fig. 1 for an example display), centered at fixation, of
which one arm was green (RGB values: 0, 204, 0) and the
other, blue (RGB values: 0, 183, 255), whereas the
intersection of the arms was black (RGB values: 0, 0, 0).
One arm was slightly longer than the other (3.6º and 3.8º).
Each arm was equally likely to be blue or green and long or
short, but one arm was always blue and the other green, and
one was always long and one short. The cross was
displayed inside a gray rectangle (RGB values: 204, 204,
204) subtending 6º ×5 º with a black background. At all
other times, the display background was black.
White noise at 48 dB was played continuously for 1.9 s
during each trial, starting at the beginning of each trial and
stopping 2 s before the end. In the critical and control trials,
a 180-Hz pure tone at 28 dB of either 100 or 150 ms in
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cross. All auditory stimuli were prepared with NCH Tone
Generator 2.01 (NCH Software, Inc., Greenwood Village,
CO). Sound pressure levels were measured in dB using a
Ruel & Kjær Precision 2209 sound meter at the earpiece of
the headphones in a soundproofed room.
The stimuli were presented in one block of eight trials,
with the CS presented in the final two trials (the critical and
control trials). One of a set of four different stimulus
displays (two colors × two lengths) was randomly selected
with equal probability for each trial.
Procedure See Fig. 1 for a graphical illustration of the
experimental procedure. A white fixation dot was presented
at the center of a black screen for 900 ms at the start of each
trial, followed by the cross display for 150 ms, and
subsequently a black screen for 2.85 s, during which
participants could make the cross task response. This time
window elapsed regardless of whether or not a response
was made. The experimenter pressed the space bar to start
the next trial. In the low-load condition, the participants’
task was to decide which arm of the cross was blue,
whereas in the high-load condition, their task was to decide
which arm was longest. Participants were instructed to
make their cross response as accurately as possible, and
responses were not speeded. The “K” key was pressed if
the horizontal arm of the cross was blue or longer, and the
“L” key was pressed if it was the vertical arm. There was
no feedback for cross task responses except during the
practice trials. Participants were informed that they should
wear headphones for the duration of the experiment and
that a “hiss” (white noise) would be played during each trial
in order to aid concentration by blocking out noise from
people passing the testing room. Participants seemed to take
this instruction at face value and did not seem suspicious.
Awareness of the CS in the critical trial was assessed with
an on-screen prompt, immediately following the cross task
response, asking whether the participant had noticed
anything different about the sound coming through the
headphones during the last trial. They were subsequently
asked to describe to the experimenter what they had heard
(even if they said they had not noticed anything different).
In the final trial, participants were instructed to ignore the
cross and to just listen carefully to the sound coming
through the headphones. They were then asked to describe
what they had heard.
Each participant performed either low- or high-load trials
(selected alternately; low for half of the participants, high
for the other half). Before starting the experiment, each
participant was shown six example trials, the first three with
a cross duration of 1,050 ms to enable clearer viewing of
the stimulus, and the next three at the normal experimental
duration (150 ms). Feedback was given on screen after each
of these practice trials. Each participant then completed a
single experimental block of eight trials, of which the
seventh was the critical trial and the eighth was the control
trial, during both of which the CS was presented. Any
participant who failed to report the presence of the CS in
the control trial or who responded incorrectly to the cross
task in the critical trial was excluded from the analysis and
replaced with a new participant.
Results and discussion
Cross task A one-way ANOVA on mean error rates in the
low- and high-load conditions revealed that error rates were
Fig. 1 (Top panel) Each block
contained eighttrials.(Leftpanel)
In the first six trials, a 900-ms
fixation dot was followed by the
cross stimulus for 150 ms, and
subsequently by a blank screen
for 2,850 ms, during which time
participants made their cross task
response. White noise was played
at 48 dB over headphones for
1,900 ms from the start of each
trial, ending 850 ms into the
response screen. (Right panel) In
the seventh and eighth trials, the
criticalstimulus(a180-Hz,28-dB
pure tone) was presented concur-
rently with the cross stimulus for
either 100 or 150 ms, embedded
in the white noise. Awareness of
the critical stimulus was assessed
immediately following the task
response with an on-screen prompt
1782 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:1780–1789significantly higher in the high-load condition (M = 14%)
than in the low-load condition (M = 0%), F(1, 54) = 24.83,
MSE = 2,457.88, p < .001, )p
2 ¼ :315 (two tailed, as is
every statistical test in this article). Our manipulation of
visual perceptual load was therefore effective.
CS awareness Participants were considered to have been
aware of the CS if they reported hearing something
different in the critical trial. As is shown in Fig. 2, there
was a clear effect of visual perceptual load on inattentional
deafness, with 21 out of 28 reporting awareness in the low-
load condition, and only 7 of 28 reporting awareness of
the CS in the high-load condition, χ
2(1, N =5 6 )=1 4 . 0 0 ,
p < .001. The duration of the CS (either 100 or 150 ms)
had no effect on the modulation of inattentional deafness
by load: 11 out of 16 participants reported awareness of
the 100-ms CS in the low-load condition, whereas 4 out
of 16 did in the high-load condition, χ
2(1, N = 32) = 6.10,
p < .05; likewise, 10 out of 12 reported awareness of the
150-ms CS in the low-load condition, whereas 3 out of
1 2d i ds oi nt h eh i g h - l o a dc o n d i t i o n ,χ
2(1, N = 24) =
8.20, p < .01. Thus, high perceptual load in a visual
attention task resulted in fewer incidences of awareness of
a task-unrelated auditory stimulus. These results provide
preliminary support for the notion of a shared perceptual
processing resource between the auditory and visual
modalities.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that perceptual load in a
visual attention task modulated participants’ awareness of a
task-unrelated pure tone embedded in white noise. In
Experiment 2, we sought to examine whether the load on
visual attention would reduce awareness of the same sound
(i.e., of equal pitch, volume, and duration) when it was
presented alone, unmasked by the white noise, thereby
exhibiting a higher signal-to-noise ratio. In addition, the
presentation of white noise in all experimental trials in
Experiment 1 might have led participants to treat all sound
as a distraction and to attempt to actively ignore it. In
Experiment 2, we therefore removed the presentation of
white noise from all trials. A pure tone of the same volume
as in Experiment 1 was presented in the critical trial with no
accompanying white noise. It was now, therefore, the first
sound that we presented to each participant. A more
frequent failure to notice this sound in the high-
perceptual-load condition of Experiment 2 would confirm
an effect of load on inattentional deafness rather than an
effect on the active ignoring of distractors.
Method
Participants Forty-eight new participants were recruited at
UCL. Nine of the participants were excluded and replaced,
either because they did not report awareness of the CS in
the control trial, or because they responded incorrectly to
the cross task in the critical trial, or because their mean error
rate on the cross task was greater than 40%. The mean age of
those included was 21.1 years (SD = 3.1 years), and there
were 19 males. All of the participants in this experiment had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal hearing, and
were naïve to the purposes of the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure The apparatus, stimuli, and proce-
dure were the same as in Experiment 1, except that no
white noise was played through the headphones on each
trial. The same 180-Hz pure tone at 28 dB of either 100 or
150 ms duration (equally likely) was presented at the onset
of the cross. Participants were informed that they should
wear headphones for the duration of the experiment in order
to aid concentration by blocking out noise from people
passing the testing room. Participants seemed to take this
instruction at face value and did not appear to be
suspicious.
Results and discussion
Cross task The mean error rate was again significantly
higher in the high-load condition (M = 17%) than in the
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Fig. 2 Percentages of participants reporting awareness of the critical
stimulus in the low- and high-load conditions in Experiment 1 (N =5 6 ) ,
in which the stimulus was embedded in 1.9 s of white noise that was
presented on every trial; Experiment 2 (N = 48), in which the stimulus
was presented alone; and Experiment 3 (N = 64), which featured longer
blocks of trials
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:1780–1789 17832,241.33, p = .001, )p
2 ¼ :202, confirming that our
manipulation of visual perceptual load was effective.
CS awareness Visual perceptual load strongly influenced
the incidence of inattentional deafness (see Fig. 2), with 21
out of 24 reporting awareness of the CS in the low-load
condition and only 5 out of 24 reporting it in the high-load
condition, χ
2(1, N = 48) = 21.48, p < .001. As with
Experiment 1, the duration of the CS (either 100 or 150 ms)
had no effect on the modulation of inattentional deafness
by visual perceptual load: 10 out of 12 participants
reported awareness of the 100-ms CS in the low-load
condition, whereas 2 out of 12 did in the high-load
condition, χ
2(1, N =2 4 )=1 0 . 7 0 ,p < .01; likewise, 11 out
of 12 reported awareness of the 150-ms CS in the low-load
condition, whereas 3 out of 12 did in the high-load
condition, χ
2(1, N =2 4 )=1 1 . 0 0 ,p <. 0 0 1 .Experiment 2
therefore demonstrated that high perceptual load in a
visual attention task reduces auditory awareness, thereby
producing inattentional deafness, even with an unmasked
tone and when people are not actively ignoring sound.
Experiment 3
We account for the effect of visual task load on auditory
awareness by suggesting that visual perceptual processing
consumed more attentional capacity in the high-load task
than in the low-load task, leaving less capacity available to
process task-irrelevant stimuli. However, because the
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 performed exclusively
either a low- or a high-load task, alternative accounts of the
results in terms of differences in the overall level of
motivation, vigilance, task engagement, or performance
strategies remained viable. For example, upon receiving the
instructions and encountering the first few example trials,
those who performed the high-load task might have decided
to engage more in the task than those who performed the
low-load task. The effect of load on awareness would then
be attributable to participants’ intentions rather than to the
availability of perceptual processing capacity. To rule out
these alternative accounts, in Experiment 3 we randomly
intermixed low- and high-visual-load tasks within a longer
block of 143 trials. In addition, we changed the low-load
cross task from a color discrimination to a line length
discrimination with a far greater line length difference than
in the high-load condition, so that the same task was
performed in all trials. Since participants would know that
the task involved both levels of load and would not know
the level of load on each trial in advance, alternative
accounts of the effects of load in terms of intention and
overall task engagement strategies could be ruled out. In
addition, participants’ overall levels of vigilance and
motivation would be constant across the randomly inter-
mixed load trials, and so could not account for any effect of
load on awareness.
Method
Participants Sixty-four new participants were recruited at
UCL. Of these, 25 participants were excluded and replaced,
either because they did not report awareness of the CS in
the control trial, or because they responded incorrectly to
the cross task in the critical trial, or because their mean
error rate on the high-load cross task was greater than 40%.
The mean age of those included was 22.2 years (SD =
3.7 years), and there were 19 males. All of the participants
in this experiment had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, normal hearing, and were naïve to the purposes of
the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure For the high-perceptual-load condi-
tion, the same stimuli were used as in Experiments 1 and 2.
For the low-load condition, the task was now the same as
for the high-load condition, but the stimuli were now
different: the short arm was considerably shorter (1.4º) than
the long arm (3.8º). The colors of the cross arms were
unchanged but were of no consequence. Responses were
now speeded, and the 2.85-s blank screen following cross
offset terminated on response. Feedback was given follow-
ing each trial, in the form of the word “correct” in blue or
“incorrect” in red, at the center of the screen for 500 ms.
There was no feedback given in the critical trial. The CS
was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that it was
always of 150-ms duration, and, as in Experiment 2,n o
white noise was played.
The stimuli were presented in two blocks of 72 trials
with the CS presented in the final trial (the critical trial),
and the control trial was performed afterward. One of a set
of eight different stimulus displays (two colors × four
lengths) was randomly selected with equal probability for
each trial. The exception to this was the critical trial, for
which load was counterbalanced across participants. The
practice block now consisted of 18 trials, also containing
randomly intermixed low- and high-load trials. In all other
respects, the stimuli and apparatus were the same as those
for Experiment 2.
Results and discussion
Cross task The greater number of trials in this experiment
allowed us to analyze RTs. Trials in which the search
response was incorrect and those in which the RT was
greater than 1.5 s were excluded from the RT analysis.
This resulted in excluding 14.6% trials from the analysis.
A one-way ANOVA on mean RTs and error rates in the
1784 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:1780–1789low- and high-perceptual-load conditions revealed that
mean RTs were significantly longer in the high-load
condition (M = 949 ms) than in the low-load condition (M
=6 4 9m s ) ,F(1, 63) = 424.59, MSE = 6,749.45, p < .001,
)p
2 ¼ :871, and error rates in the high-load condition (M =
19%) were significantly higher than in the low-load
condition (M =2 % ) ,F(1, 63) = 273.83, MSE = 34.21, p
<. 0 0 1 ,)p
2 ¼ :8 1 3 .O u rm a n i p u l a t i o no fl o a di nt h i s
experiment was therefore as effective as in the blocked
design we employed in the previous experiments.
CS awareness Just as with the previous experiments, there
was a clear effect of visual perceptual load on awareness of
the CS (see Fig. 2), with 28 out of 32 reporting awareness
in the low-load condition and 18 of 32 reporting awareness
in the high-load condition, χ
2(1, N = 64) = 7.70, p=. 005.
Since we replicated the effect of visual perceptual load
found in Experiments 1 and 2, but this time with
participants performing both low- and high-load trials,
randomly intermixed within blocks, and with the same task
for both conditions of load, interpretations of the results in
terms of motivation, vigilance, task engagement, or strategy
can be ruled out.
Although the effect of load on awareness was robust
(areductionof31%),theeffectwas strongerinExperiments 1
and 2 (reductions of 50% and 67%, respectively). This
difference could reflect improvement in the high-load task
over the much longer series of trials (143 instead of 6).
Alternatively, it could indicate that there was a vigilance or
strategy component to the effect in Experiments 1 and 2 that
was abolished when trials were randomly intermixed within
blocks.
General discussion
The present research establishes a new equivalent of
inattentional blindness in the auditory domain, namely
“inattentional deafness,” and highlights the level of percep-
tual load in a visual task as a critical determinant of this
effect. In three experiments, our results consistently showed
that people fail to notice the mere presence of a simple
auditory tone presented unexpectedly on the last trial while
performing a crosshair line judgment task (concerning the
line length or color). Importantly, the level of perceptual
load in this visual discrimination task modulated the
incidence of inattentional deafness. The high-load task,
which required a subtle line length discrimination, led to a
far greater rate of failing to notice the sound as compared to
the low-load task, which required a very obvious line length
or line color judgment. Importantly, this effect remained
when load conditions were randomly intermixed within a
longer series of trials. Thus, inattentional deafness in our
study was clearly influenced by the level of visual
perceptual load in the task rather than by any differences
in motivation, vigilance, task engagement, or strategy (cf.
Theeuwes, Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004).
These findings establish the phenomenon of inattentional
deafness under visual load and extend the load theory of
attention and cognitive control to address the cross-modal
effect of visual attentional load on awareness of auditory
information. They suggest that the elementary process of
noticing the mere presence of a sound depends on an
attentional capacity resource that is shared between the
modalities of vision and hearing. This conclusion makes a
novel contribution to the understanding of the determinants
of awareness failures, and to capacity limits across the
different senses, and it has important implications with
regard to everyday tasks such as driving. We discuss these
contributions in the following sections.
Failures of awareness within and between sensory
modalities
A large body of research has established inattentional
blindness in the visual domain and highlighted the critical
role of perceptual load. This research has revealed that
people may fail to notice various unattended stimuli—for
example, simple shapes, meaningful objects, words or
events (Most, Simons, et al., 2001; Neisser & Becklen,
1975; Rock & Gutman, 1981; Simons & Chabris, 1999)—
while attending to a task involving high perceptual load (e.
g., keeping a separate count of different types of ball
passes). The effects of inattentional blindness have gener-
alized across measures of high-level recognition—for
example, identifying words or comprehending the content
of an ignored passage of text (Mack & Rock, 1998; Moray,
1959; Neisser, 1968; Rees, Russell, Frith, & Driver, 1999)
—and measures of lower-level visual detection—such as
noticing the mere presence of a simple shape (Mack &
Rock, 1998; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Most,
Simons, et al., 2001).
The effects of inattentional blindness have also general-
ized across both long and short delays between the
presentation of the critical stimulus and the measure of
awareness: for example, when awareness reports are
collected at the end of a presentation video or stream
(e.g., Most, Schroll, et al., 2005; Most, Simons et al.,
2001; Neisser & Becklen, 1975;R o c k&G u t m a n ,1981;
Simons & Chabris, 1999), or when these are collected
shortly after presentation of the critical stimulus in the
final experiment trial (e.g., Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2007; Downing, Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004;M a c k&
Rock, 1998). Therefore, memory failure, which may
contribute to inattentional blindness in paradigms featur-
ing a long delay before awareness reports are made or
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of text, is not a likely alternative explanation for the
phenomenon of inattentional blindness in general. The
interpretation of inattentional blindness as reflecting a
perceptual detection failure has received support from a
recent study that demonstrated that high attentional load
reduces the perceptual sensitivity of visual, task-irrelevant
stimuli and has no effect on response criterion, in a
paradigm in which awareness reports were made as soon
as the critical stimulus had been presented, or even before
the task response (Macdonald & Lavie, 2008).
In contrast, inattentional deafness has so far only been
demonstrated in studies involving the rather high-level
process of semantic word recognition, in which awareness
reportsfollowedafairlylongdelayattheendofapresentation
stream. For instance, Moray (1959) demonstrated that at the
end of the experiment, following performance of a dichotic
listening paradigm, people failed to recognize the content of
words presented in the unattended ear, even if these had been
repeated many times during the experiment.
Sinnett et al. (2006), in a more recent and rather
thorough investigation of the effects of attention on word
recognition within and between sensory modalities, estab-
lished that people fail to recognize words presented
auditorily while they attend to a rapid stream of either
pictures or sounds. Recognition memory for these words
was considerably lower for both within- and between-
modality and conditions than when the words were
attended in a control condition. These findings clearly
show that word recognition depends on a capacity-limited
resource common to vision and hearing. However, the
retrospective measure of recognition, following a stream of
words, leaves open the alternative explanation that the
words had been forgotten rather than not perceived.
Furthermore, the comparison of attended and unattended
words in different blocks could have involved intentions or
strategy, in addition to any effect of perceptual load.
Our findings, however, support the authors’ attentional
interpretation, while ruling out strategy-based alternative
accounts of the effect of load (see Exp.3). Importantly, our
findings extend previous inattentional blindness research in
demonstrating that perceptual load in a visual task
modulates the fundamental process of noticing the presence
of a simple sound.
The short stimulus and response durations used in our
paradigm rendered an account of inattentional deafness in
terms of forgetting the sound had occurred rather than not
perceiving it unlikely. Nevertheless, it is possible that some
instances of inattentional deafness in our task involved a
failure to encode the sound into memory or to consolidate a
weak memory trace over the short delay incurred by
preparing and making a task response, rather than a failure
to perceive the sound in the first place (see, e.g., Moore,
2001). In addition, the present results are limited to the case
of unexpected sounds. A future study adopting Macdonald
and Lavie’s( 2008) paradigm to test detection sensitivity for
expected auditory stimuli could address both of these
issues. The present findings, however, do not hinge on
these factors. Irrespective of any potential contribution of
failures to encode or consolidate a memory trace of the
sound, the present findings clearly demonstrate that the
subjective experience of noticing a sound depends on the
level of visual perceptual load in the task being undertaken.
This is not only important for the theoretical understanding
of the determinants of awareness but is also highly
applicable to real-world settings: It is often the case that
important auditory information is unexpected (e.g., the
sound of your car alarm), and the potential applied benefits
of understanding the task determinants of the likelihood of
failures to notice such auditory information remain,
irrespective of whether the failures to notice are purely
perceptual or involve a failure to encode into memory.
Further future research could generalize the effect of load
on the awareness of a sound that we report here across
differentmanipulationsofperceptualloadinavisualtask;that
is, the stimuli could be varied—for example, the number of
nontargets or similarity of nontargets to targets in a
search task—rather than the task (e.g., Lavie, 1995;L a v i e&
Cox, 1997;M a c d o n a l d&L a v i e ,2008). In addition, it will
be important to establish whether the effects we report here
can be distinguished from the effects of visual task difficulty.
Lavie and de Fockert (2003) demonstrated that under certain
conditions the effects of visual perceptual load can be
distinguished from the effects of extreme sensory degrada-
tion and an overall increase in task difficulty. When
participants performed a letter identification task, extreme
degradation of the sensory input that rendered the target
letter stimulus barely visible subjected task performance to
sensory “data limits” rather than attentional resource limits
(see Norman & Bobrow, 1975), and therefore did not reduce
distractor processing. Although the high-load line length
discrimination task we used was demanding, the length
difference was clearly visible, given that accuracy rates were
well above chance (86%, 83%, and 81% in the three
experiments, respectively). Hence, the task demands were in
the range of resource limits rather than data limits, and
therefore any effects of the task reflect attentional resource
loadratherthansensorydegradation.Futureresearchcouldgo
further, however, to distinguish the effect of perceptual load
from that of sensory degradation by using peri-threshold
discrimination tasks in the high-load condition and assess the
effect on the incidence of inattentional blindness or deafness.
The effect we have established involved a pure tone and
generalized across two different signal-to-noise ratios, since
in Experiment 1 the pure tone was accompanied by white
noise, producing a sound of low signal-to-noise ratio, and
1786 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:1780–1789in Experiment 2 it was not, thereby rendering the pure tone
of a higher signal-to-noise ratio. Future research should also
address whether the effect found here generalizes to sounds
varied across a range of dimensions—for example, volume,
pitch, and timbre—while also considering the signal-to-
noise ratio.
Capacity limits across vision and hearing
There is a growing body of evidence for a shared attentional
capacity between the modalities of vision and hearing. For
example, the aforementioned study by Sinnett et al. (2006)
showed reduced word recognition rates when attention was
paid to a demanding stimulus stream, irrespective of whether
the words and stream were presented in the same or different
modalities. Furthermore, a few recent studies have demon-
strated that the cost to performance involved in coordinating
two tasks, as compared to a single task, is not reduced—and
in fact in some cases is increased—when the two tasks draw
on separate sensory modalities (e.g., vision and hearing)
rather than the same sensory modality (see, e.g., Brand-
D’Abrescia & Lavie, 2008; Hunt & Kingstone, 2004;
Jolicœur, 1999). In one other example, Santangelo et al.
(2007), using a peripheral cuing paradigm, showed that
focusing attention on a central stream of visual or auditory
characters involving a high-perceptual-load task (letter or
digit identification) led to reduced cuing effects for periph-
eral cues, irrespective of whether the cues were presented in
the same sensory modality as the central stream or a different
one.
The conclusion from our study, that the process of
noticing a simple tone depends on a shared attentional
capacity between hearing and vision, is consistent with
these previous studies. Indeed, it offers an explanation for
some of these previous findings in terms of reduced
awareness of the cue stimulus (in Santangelo et al., 2007)
or of the ignored words (in Sinnett et al., 2006) under their
task conditions of high perceptual load.
The discrepancy between these demonstrations of shared
capacity between vision and hearing and other lines of
work that have suggested that some attentional capacities
appeartobemodalityspecific(e.g.,Duncanetal.,1997; Soto-
Faraco, Morein-Zamir, & Kingstone, 2005; Tellinghuisen &
Nowak, 2003; Treisman & Davies, 1973) may in some cases
be accounted for by task-specific effects. For example, in
one previous study, high visual perceptual load was found to
reduce response competition effects from visual distractor
letters, but the same manipulation of visual perceptual load
had no effect on response competition effects from auditory
distractor letters (Tellinghuisen & Nowak, 2003). However,
in this study, the presentation durations of the visual and
auditory distractor letters were different: Whereas the visual
distractor letters were presented for the same duration as the
target letters, the auditory distractor letters were presented for
a longer duration, ending 200 ms after the offset of the visual
target displays. As such, there was a greater temporal overlap
between the processing of the visual target and the auditory
distractor in the high-load condition (in which the target
search took longer) than in the low-load condition, and this
may have offset the effect of load.
It is, of course, possible that some processing capacities
are modality specific, while others draw on a shared cross-
modal resource. For example, previous findings that
perception of visual motion is reduced by attending to a
high-load visual stimulus stream but not to an auditory
word stream (Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997, 2001) may
indicate that the perception of visual motion only suffers
from visual capacity limits. In addition, the attentional
blink—the reduction in perception of a second target
when it is presented within 300 ms of the first target in
an RSVP stream—appears to have modality-specific
limits: It is only found when the two targets are
presented within the same modality (e.g., Duncan et al.,
1997; Soto-Faraco & Spence, 2002). This may indicate
that the temporal limits on perceptual processing are
modality specific, perhaps due to the different timings of
t h ei n f o r m a t i o np r o c e s s i n gi ne a c hm o d a l i t y .
While our study does not attempt to resolve the discrep-
ancy between studies indicating shared or separate capacity
limitsbetweenthesenses,itdoesmakeclearthatinthecaseof
awareness of the mere presence of a simple tone, vision and
hearing share a common processing resource,ratherthan each
having its own pool. Indeed, the sizes of the effects of visual
perceptualloadonincidencesofinattentionaldeafnessthatwe
report are of magnitudes similar to those reported previously
for the same manipulation of visual perceptual load on
incidences of inattentional blindness. In our experiments,
high load increased incidences of inattentional deafness by
49% on average, whereas Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007)
found that the same manipulation of load increased
incidences of inattentional blindness by 44% on average
(Exps. 1 and 3). Therefore, it appears that, at least for
measures of awareness, the visual and auditory modalities
share the same capacity-limited resource.
Finally, our demonstration that visual perceptual task
load leads to the failure to notice the presence of a task-
unrelated auditory stimulus has significant implications for
everyday life. For instance, our results imply that people
would be less likely to notice an auditory alarm while
engaged in a high-visual-load computer task, or more
importantly, the sound of a car horn while attending to a
visually loaded billboard. The implications of research on
inattentional blindness for daily life tasks such as driving
have begun to be noted by some public authorities—for
example, Traffic for London, which has begun a campaign
to alert drivers to the dangers of inattentional blindness.
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:1780–1789 1787The present research suggests that they also ought to
consider the effects of inattentional deafness under load.
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